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Introduction
In the few years since its inception following the 1998 Franco-British Saint-
Malo Summit, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has progressed
enormously, certainly when compared with the preceding fifty years. A whole
new politico-military dimension has been added to the EU. ESDP is not just a
paper exercise, as a dozen ongoing operations involving more than 8,000 troops
and 500 civilians demonstrate. If other operations in which EU Member States
participate are counted as well (national, NATO, UN and ad hoc coalitions) the
number of Member States’ armed forces that is constantly deployed stands at 70
to 80,000.
Yet these impressive figures also represent more or less the maximum effort that
Member States can make today, in spite of the fact that together the twenty-
seven number nearly 2 million men and women in uniform. Europe’s armed
forces thus still face an enormous problem of efficiency and effectiveness. Ten
years since the beginning of ESDP is a short time to judge its impact, yet the
question must be asked whether the existing mechanisms, those of NATO
included, are really sufficient to achieve the required transformation. The Lis-
bon Treaty and its clauses on ESDP (to be renamed CSDP) offers an occasion to
draw up the “state of the union” in this area.
On 28-29 April 2008 Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations
and the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES) brought
together practitioners and academics from a wide range of Member States and
institutions at a seminar in the Egmont Palace in Brussels, in order to assess
Europe’s defence effort, including in the NATO context, and explore the
Treaty’s potential to realize a quantum leap. The seminar focussed in particular
on the question whether a shift could and should be made from the current
national focus of Member States and bottom-up nature of ESDP to a truly inte-
grative approach. This Egmont Paper includes a summary of the debates as well
as contributions from a number of speakers. The editors hope it can serve as a
useful contribution to the debate on European defence.
Sven BISCOP & Franco ALGIERI1
1. Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop is a senior research fellow at Egmont and visiting professor for European
security at the College of Europe in Bruges. Dr. Franco Algieri is director of research at AIES. 5
Europe’s Military Ambition
JO COELMONT2
What is Europe’s military level of ambition? First – and rightly so – this question
is addressed from a political point of view, and subsequently complemented
with a strategic and diplomatic approach, before being transferred to the mili-
tary – supplemented with the implicit suggestion “do something about it, Gen-
eral, something practical”. This is exactly what the military has been doing these
last years. Taking into account the broad political guidance provided after the
St-Malo meeting, such as the Headline Goals, the European Security Strategy
(ESS), and the Lisbon Treaty, very detailed military scenario’s have been devel-
oped, leading in term to the identification of detailed military requirements.
Implicitly all this provides a good picture of Europe’s military level of ambition.
So the main message is that from a military-technical perspective, pretty good
results have been achieved, solid enough to bring them back to the political level
for further decision-making.
Building-blocks of a Military Level of Ambition
From the ESS the military message is:
1. Worldwide. There are no geographical limitations, neither to the European
continent nor to Africa. This has implications for strategic transport and
deployment times.
2. Multilateralism. This has implications for C2 structures, for upstream plan-
ning and for the conduct of operations. Capabilities are to be developed so
that we can operate together with NATO, the UN, the AU, and other poten-
tial partners.
3. A Civil-Military approach. This has similar implications both for the struc-
tures of the EU and outside.
4. Reaction times. The need to act preventively is stressed, as well as the need
to develop a rapid response capability.
5. But... The ESS is not a full- fledged strategy. It does not clearly identify the
required means nor the ways to achieve the strategic objectives. So the ESS
leaves us with a clair-obscur as to the exact types of military missions to
2. Brigadier-General (ret.) Jo Coelmont is the former Belgian Military Representative to the
EUMC. THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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undertake as well as to the scale of these military operations. Fortunately
additional political guidance is available.
With the Lisbon Treaty we now have a common and a clear understanding of
the Petersberg tasks. Not so long ago we were facing 15 and later even 27 very
different interpretations of these military tasks. The Lisbon Treaty makes it clear
that it is about the most broad interpretation one can imagine, ranging from
SSR, through the fight against terrorism, up to peace enforcement. The Treaty
even provides for a Solidarity Clause and for Mutual Defence. In short, apart
from collective defence, all kinds of military operations one can at present real-
istically invent in our global world can all be undertaken in a European context
as an ESDP (or CSDP) operation. So, there is now full clarity as to the type of
potential military missions.
The remaining elements required to launch a genuine process by military plan-
ners are provided by the Helsinki Headline Goal (HLG 2003) and the Headline
Goal 2010 (HLG 2010). The HLG 2003 is utterly clear about the scale of a
potential EU military operation, i.e. to effectively deal with a crisis such as the
one we witnessed in Yugoslavia. The HLG 2010 provides a list of specific mile-
stones to reach within the 2010 horizon on such issues as an operations centre,
strategic lift, aircraft carriers and even space assets. It also provides a qualitative
approach and a way ahead.
Al these building blocks made it possible for military planners from the 27 cap-
itals to produce, together with the EUMS, a requirement catalogue (RC05).
Based on illustrative scenarios and guidelines as to the concurrency of some
military operations, this catalogue offers detailed quantitative and qualitative
information on required military capabilities. Producing such a catalogue was
not an easy task. Even with all the political guidance mentioned, some ambigu-
ities remained. But sound military judgment led to consensus and gave us a doc-
ument that reflects pretty well the ambitions formulated in the ESS. Of course,
one can always improve such a process. But in this author’s judgement it will
have but marginal impact on the final results. Important is to remind that finally
“a military level of ambition” has now been identified. And, what is even more
important, in doing so all shortfalls regarding military capabilities haven been
clearly identified as well.
When developing military capabilities it does not suffice to prepare for the last
military campaign. The Long Term Vision (LTV) established by the European
Defence Agency together with the EU Military Committee looks into the world
the ESDP may be operating in 20 years from now. It identifies the implications
for military contributions and capability development. Moreover it pointsTHE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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towards some key issues for defence planners in our respective capitals. All this
may look very logical and thus self-evident. But it is worthwhile noting that in
history this is the very first time that we are looking commonly to future require-
ments to support the military level of ambition of the EU.
One can conclude that at present we have enough insight in the military level of
ambition to launch a reliable planning process. The train has left the station,
going in the right direction – will it reach its destination?
Determinants of Military Ambition on the Ground
One should not to use the military level of recent or ongoing operations as an
upper limit. This would be like looking from a distance to a youngster of 10
years old and stating this person will no longer grow or gain weight for the rest
of his or her life. Three factors determine the future of EU military operations.
First, the political will to effectively launch military operations whenever appro-
priate to underpin the objectives put forward in the ESS. Translated into more
military terms this also means that listening military capabilities in a force cata-
logue or identifying land, air or maritime forces on a roster of Battle Groups or
similar military forces may no longer be considered as a non-binding gesture,
but as a strong political signal of engagement. If afterwards it is commonly
decided by Member States to launch an EU military operation, these capabilities
and forces should as a rule be made available.
Our capability to close, at 27, the remaining military shortfalls constitutes a
second factor. Whenever we mount a specific military operation a Statement of
Military Requirements (CJSOR) is identified and through a Force Generation
Conference we make sure the complete list is filled. This is never an easy process.
But so far within the EU we have been able to fill all the requirements before the
EUMC gave its final advise on the military aspects of launching an operation.
This brings us to the suggestion is to organise Capability Generation Confer-
ences aiming to fill up the commonly identified shortfalls within a reasonable
timeframe (up to one or in some particular instances two decades). Such an
endeavour could be part of Permanent Structured Cooperation. It would be
inclusive from the outset.
Preconditions for Member States would be to:
1. Be prepared to revisit their respective national planning.
2. Be prepared to do away with national military capabilities proven to be
redundant at the European level.THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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3. Be prepared to pool assets and capabilities, including logistics and training
facilities in order to generate savings.
4. Be prepared to take a fair share in the programmes set up to fill up the stra-
tegic shortfalls, in particular by joining programs set up by the EDA.
5. Last but not least, be prepared to actively contribute to the negotiations as
long as it takes to reach full success. This would probably – and from a
military perspective rightly so – lead us to a permanent conference, a perma-
nent process.
Political Momentum
A revision – or better a completion – of the ESS offers the potential to generate
the necessary political momentum. The ESS is in the first place a political docu-
ment and should remain a political document. Europe’s foreign and security
policy as well as its defence policy would however be greatly served by complet-
ing the ESS with guidelines as to how we should act to come to a genuinely
comprehensive approach, on how to effectively join up all the instruments of the
EU, be it the ones from the Commission, the Secretariat General or from Mem-
ber States. A timely update of the ESS could inspire the ongoing work on the
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty by introducing strategic and tactical think-
ing on security matters.
In the second instance, a revised ESS could give directions on how to deal with
some specific military matters, on how to complement the bottom-up approach
used at present by Member States to generate military capabilities with top-
down steering involving the Secretariat General, the Commission and other EU
instruments such as the EDA.
Thirdly, an updated and more detailed ESS would offer an additional sound
basis for a continued constructive Transatlantic dialogue leading to even more
mutual benefits. This will be one of the strongest determining factors with
regard to the EU’s military level of ambition, its military presence on the terrain
and indeed the further development of ESDP as such, for the simple reason that
all this will influence the thinking in all the capitals of our Transatlantic com-
munity.THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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Permanent Command & Control
Throughout history command & control has been considered critical to success.
A comprehensive approach to crisis management demands even more attention
to C2. It is about achieving unity of effort by all parties involved while main-
taining unity of command for the actual military operations. C2 is a concept,
but it is not that abstract. In a given operation it gets real, it even gets a face, the
face of its Commander. This is part of the beauty of C2. However, this is also
part of the political problems we are witnessing on the issue of an EU headquar-
ters.
From history we learn that the best way to use power is to show it, to act pre-
ventively, and if this fails to intervene in an early stage of the conflict. All this
suggest to be permanently aware, to develop timely contingency planning in
order to launch the required operations at very short notice. This suggest to do
away with improvising or ad hocery, especially in the C2 area.
In NATO collective wisdom brought us to build a strong Alliance around a
permanent C2 structure. That was and remains key. The new geo-strategic and
political realities led us to reduce the number of HQs and to maintain but a
single operational headquarters (OHQ). At the OHQ level we have at present
within the EU the Ops Centre (within the EUMS) and up to 5 OHQs provided
by Member States. None of them with solid permanent structures. All of them
with a lot of arrangements to be put in place at a very late stage in the crisis
management procedure (on the eve of troop deployments). And for non-auton-
omous operations the EU can call upon NATO’s planning capabilities. Until
now auto-limitations have prevented Member States from providing even two
planning officers each to the EUMS in order to create a modest but permanent
core planning staff. Instead an even bigger group of planning officers from 27
capitals travel regularly across the continent to the different HQs, for training
sessions. So it clearly not about the availability of planning officers. It is about
structures.
The weaknesses of these solutions have been demonstrated during the prepara-
tion phase and the conduct of the EU military operations in the DRC and Chad.
These lessons learned should put us in a position to leave the theological debates
behind us. Sound analysis will generate consensus among Member States and
lead us to more effective, more efficient, less ad hoc but more permanent struc-
tures.THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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Conclusion
At the military-technical level, the military have done their part of the process,
their part of the military planning. The catalogues provided as well as the Long
Term Vision will never stand in line for a Nobel Prize for accuracy. That never
was the intention. However, these documents provide solid enough details on
Europe’s military ambition to take further political steps.11
Permanent Structured Cooperation
PIERRE HOUGARDY
The introduction of permanent structured cooperation (PermStrucCoop) in the
field of defence is an important innovation in the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, the
establishment of PermStrucCoop could create a momentum for those Member
States that want to deepen their cooperation in different defence-related areas
such as amongst others capability development, operations, training, logistics,
joint acquisitions. Already in the preamble of the protocol on PermStrucCoop
it is recognised that the strengthening of the security and defence policy will
require efforts by Member States in the area of capabilities. Hence, the key ques-
tion is: how can PermStrucCoop have a fundamental and unremitting influence
on the way a credible EU defence is developed and implemented?
PermStrucCoop calls, amongst others, for cooperation with a view to achieving
approved objectives concerning the level of investment expenditure on defence
equipment. Criteria are definitely needed to allow a meaningful assessment.
However, in this field, discussions should not be led by dogmatism but rather by
pragmatism. Defining realistic criteria should help the political leaders and the
defence experts to understand each other, and be an incentive to sustain the
efforts till the objectives are met. Setting stringent input criteria has proved to
be counter-productive in the long term with regard to an effective development
of capabilities. Even if this approach seems to be laudable in terms of measure-
ment and verification, one must admit that they cause discomfort due to the
different interpretation and the nature of the figures.
Therefore, the objectives to be (negotiated and) agreed in the framework of
PermStrucCoop  should  be rather output-oriented, “reasonable” and allow
some flexibility for the implementation, aiming at the medium to longer term.
Moreover, they ought to be focused on the level of ambition of the European
Union, in particular aiming at developing the critical capabilities identified – and
to be identified – in the Capability Development Plan. These concerns could be
met through the establishment of “packages of criteria” in domains related to
e.g. operations, capability development, joint armament programmes and
allowing at least at the outset of PermStrucCoop internal compensations among
those packages.
PermStrucCoop has the potential to generate a top-down approach comple-
mented with a solid peer pressure. This top-down approach, involving decision
makers at the appropriate level, would balance the bottom-up approach whichTHE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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has framed the development of ESDP untill the establishment of the European
Defence Agency (EDA). It is also not surprising to see the role of the EDA under-
lined and reinforced in the protocol on PermStrucCoop. The relation “EU Lis-
bon Treaty – EDA” must not be considered as a new fact, but as the confirma-
tion of the role that the EDA should play in the defence sector. PermStrucCoop
should facilitate a better common understanding of defence issues, between the
political level and the military establishment, aiming at a greater coherence at
all levels, not only in the definition of concrete objectives, but more importantly,
ensuring an “end-to-end” process in the implementation of the general political
objectives. If we take the A400-M or the NH 90 programmes as example: com-
mon procurement does not necessarily mean interoperable units, common logis-
tics, training, education, doctrine etc.
We should bear in mind that the development of key capabilities necessitates a
long-term effort which is generally not in line with the horizon of political deci-
sions. PermStrucCoop must not compete with the current cooperation in the
EDA. Instead, it should reinforce the effectiveness of the EDA’s activities. The
role of the EDA should also remain “central”, in coordination with the other
EU “bodies” (Council, EUMC, Commission). We should not exclude any form
of constellation of PermStrucCoop, in order to better reflect commonalities of
interests and complementarities, on the basis of common requirements and/or
on the basis of “regional” reinforced cooperation (for example between the
Nordic countries, the Benelux, the Eurocorps countries etc.). Such an approach
would be in line with the concept of “variable geometry” applicable within the
EDA.
Effective PermStrucCoop will lead to less fragmentation and duplication of
defence efforts and to economies of scale (spend better together…), encouraging
pooling and sharing of capabilities. A key factor to success will be to what extent
participating Member States are willing to adjust their way of thinking with
regard to national defence planning. Evidently, efforts in this field will have to
be spread out in the short, medium and long term. PermStrucCoop should take
into account the broader framework of “security-defence”, taking into account
the EU civil-military approach to crises and notably the role of the European
Commission to that end. This global and multidisciplinary approach implies
that we look at capability development from a ‘dual’ perspective.
Belgium is advocating the inclusive character of PermStrucCoop as it is men-
tioned in Article 1 of the protocol (“PermStrucCoop shall be open to any Mem-
ber State”). The aim will be to find the right balance between a critical mass of
Member States participating in PermStrucCoop (ideally at 27) willing to
progress effectively and at a proper pace, leading to the substantial developmentTHE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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of European defence. This development is in line with the long-standing policy
of Belgium aspiring to more European integration.
For Belgium, multinational cooperation is absolutely essential, to meet our level
of ambition and to make the most efficient use of our resources and capabilities.
For many years, Belgium has been a pioneer in this field: as a framework nation
of the Eurocorps, sharing a common naval command with the Netherlands,
including common schools for all the fregate staff in the Netherlands and for all
the mine-hunter staff in Belgium, training of jet pilots in France, member of the
DATF (Deployable Air Task Force), EATC (European Air Transport Com-
mand), EEAW (European participating Air Forces Expeditionary Air Wings (5
x EU “F16-countries”), participating in multinational EU Battlegroups and
many others cooperations.
Consequently, one could argue that PermStrucCoop would offer Belgium a
forum where it could at least (continue to) participate in the debate on the effec-
tive development of the European Union’s defence capabilities.15
Permanent Structured Cooperation 
for a Permanently Capable ESDP
SVEN BISCOP3
The efficiency problem of Europe’s armed forces is well known: of an impressive
overall number of over two million men and women in uniform in the EU-27,
only a meagre 10 to 15% are estimated to be deployable. The causes are mani-
fold: the low cost-effectiveness of a plethora of small-scale capabilities, unnec-
essary intra-EU duplications, the presence of large numbers of quasi non-
deployable conscripts, capability gaps in terms of ‘enablers’ (strategic transport,
command, control and communications), and, although all EU Member States
are conscious of the challenge and are implementing measures, slow transforma-
tion nonetheless from territorial defence to expeditionary warfare. The question
must be asked whether the existing mechanisms, in ESDP as well as NATO, are
sufficient to achieve the required transformation within a reasonable timeframe.
The primary cause of this problematic state of affairs is the still almost exclu-
sively national focus of defence planning, while capability gaps at the aggregate
EU- and NATO-level are being ignored. Therefore, the only way to achieve the
quantum leap that is necessary to realise defence transformation is through
pooling which, by reducing intra-European duplications, can produce much
more deployable capabilities within the current combined defence budget. From
that point of view, Permanent Structured Cooperation, the new mechanism to
be established by the Lisbon Treaty for ‘those Member States whose military
capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commit-
ments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions’
(Art. 28A §6), has enormous potential. One could argue that the solutions to
Europe’s capability conundrum are in effect well known – the question is
whether PermStrucCoop can be the platform that convinces the Member States
to implement them.
PermStrucCoop can be a very flexible instrument, allowing all EU Member
States to participate, if they so choose, at their own level of means, in the way
that they choose:
– Member States wanting to take part can make an “expression of interest”.
Such a declaration would outline, in broad terms, which contribution, of
3. For a longer discussion, see Sven Biscop, Permanent Structured Cooperation and the Future of
ESDP (Egmont Paper 20). Brussels, Egmont, 2008, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/
ep20.pdf. THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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which size, in which timeframe might be considered. The aim should be for
each participating Member State to generate additional “usable” capabili-
ties, either in one or more specific shortfall areas as identified in the Progress
Catalogue, and/or through force packages covering several capability areas,
and/or with regard to longer-term, future capabilities in function of the
trends identified in the EDA’s Capability Development Plan (CDP).
– Simultaneously, the participating Member States, with the support of the
EDA, can agree on criteria for participation that apply to each specific con-
tribution, regardless of size, in terms of deployability, sustainability, interop-
erability and per capita investment in equipment. An additional criterion
might be actual participation in operations (regardless of the framework,
EU, NATO, UN or ad hoc). To be avoided are general budgetary criteria,
such as spending 2% of GDP on defence: laudable though they may be, they
are also unrealistic and will not generate additional capabilities in the short
to medium term.
– The EDA can then assess the opportunities for different forms of cooperation
and pooling in function of Member States’ declared intentions, allowing
Member States to decide which contributions they will offer on a national
basis and which in cooperation, in which format, with other Member States.
Pooling of forces offers the biggest added value. Member States can contrib-
ute national squadrons or battalions to a multination fighter force or army
division, while everything above and below that (command & control, logis-
tics, maintenance, training) could be fully integrated and located on a
reduced number of bases, thus creating huge synergies and effects of scale.
The World War II RAF can serve to illustrate the model: comprising clearly
identifiable Belgian, Dutch, Czech and Polish squadrons, it did obviously not
have a separate Belgian airfield or Polish logistics. The beauty of PermStruc-
Coop is its flexibility however: each Member State can participate in the way
it prefers.
– This process will result in a set of concrete capability objectives, to be
achieved by pre-identified units, some national, some multinational, in an
agreed timeframe.
– The EDA is responsible for monitoring progress and assessing contributions
against the agreed criteria and the evolving needs, as well as continuously
updating and proposing opportunities for cooperation, in function of the
CDP. Important is that the EDA is empowered by the Member States to play
this role to the full, in order to realise the potential of PermStrucCoop.
PermStrucCoop is not the silver bullet that will solve all problems of Europe’s
military. But because it is in the Treaty and Member States therefore have to
consider whether and how to make use of it, it presents a window of opportu-
nity to further ESDP. If a critical mass of Member States willing to go ahead withTHE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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PermStrucCoop can be found, the desire to “be in” will probably lead many
others to participate. Once in, peer pressure and the need to avoid exclusion for
no longer fulfilling the criteria should stimulate Member States’ efforts. The
only “carrot” that can stimulate Member States to set demanding criteria in the
first place however is the one that should appeal to Finance Ministers: the poten-
tial of increasing the efficiency of the defence budget.
PermStrucCoop– which itself is only a means towards deploying Europe’s forces
in the service of global peace and security. Ultimately therefore, even if the capa-
bilities are available, political willingness, to commit troops where necessary
and to act as EU, is the key. But the more integrated Europe’s military capabili-
ties will be, the more EU Member States will be pushed to act as one.19
Permanent Structured Cooperation 
in the Context of the Flexibility Debate: 
More Intergovernmentalism than Integration
FRANCO ALGIERI
1. The ESDP/CSDP Framework
The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – according to the Lisbon
Treaty to be renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – can be
considered a most interesting example to demonstrate the difficulty of bringing
together, on the one hand, an integrationist system and, on the other hand, an
intergovernmental system. An inherent ambiguity of the European integration
process as such can be realized.
Looking at the corresponding provisions of the Treaty on European Union and
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union the dualism of integration
and intergovernmentalism becomes obvious. According to article 43 (1) TEU
the “CSDP shall be an integral part of CFSP”. But “the performance of tasks”
(peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security) in
the framework of this common policy “shall be undertaken using capabilities
provided by the member states” (Art. 42 (1) TEU). Furthermore, the CSDP
“shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy” (Art.
42 (2) TEU). Even though it cannot be understood as an automatism, the treaty
states that “this will lead to a common defence”, however under the condition
that “the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides” (Art. 42 (2) TEU).
The latter article also pays tribute to “the specific character of the security and
defence policy of certain member states” and ensures that CSDP shall not cause
a respective prejudice. The most explicit example of how member states keep
control over the CSDP is Article 42 (4) emphasizing that “decisions relating to
the CSDP … shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously”.
The CSDP is a policy field guided by an integrationist ambition but controlled
by intergovernmentalism. Of course, it could be argued that the integration
process in the field of foreign policy was also developing step by step from Euro-
pean Political Cooperation (EPC), over several treaty reforms (Maastricht,
Amsterdam and Nice) to today’s CFSP. But such an incrementalism implies that
the process is moving slowly whereas the challenges the EU is facing in foreign
and security policy are at times developing with greater pace. Consequently, the
development of the CFSP, including the EDSP/CSDP, has so far mainly been aTHE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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reactive process. In addition, in an EU of 27 member states the heterogeneity of
interests has increased. Against the backdrop of these two trends it became nec-
essary to adapt existing and to develop new institutional and procedural mech-
anisms in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the policy and
decision-making process. Looking at possible ways to overcome this problem,
the idea of building elements of flexibility into the respective treaty provisions
has gained prominence.
2. Flexibility instruments for CFSP/CSDP
Two main arguments can be used to explain why flexibility is considered to
create an added value. First, it offers a possibility to overcome a standstill and/
or weakening of the EU as an actor. Second, it meets the demands of member
states willing to move ahead. As a consequence, different forms of differentia-
tion characterise the European integration process.4 It is crucial to clarify where
flexibility is applied, i.e. inside the treaty framework or outside the treaty frame-
work? The latter option would cause a serious challenge to keeping up with the
approach of developing common policies. A further question that needs to be
tackled is whether flexibility is an inclusive or exclusive concept. Taking a look
at the development of the European integration, elements of flexibility can be
found (e.g. the Schengen Agreement, the Prüm Treaty, the Euro).
Recalling the need to clarify whether groups will be formed and act inside or
outside the treaty framework, the Lisbon Treaty clearly embeds the option for
group-building within the EU framework. Analysing the provisions in the Lis-
bon Treaty concerning enhanced cooperation and permanent structured coop-
eration, the strengthening of the flexibility approach can be recognized. An
interesting formulation can be found in Article 42 (5): “The Council may entrust
the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member
States in order to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests.” Following
an overarching integrationist goal (“to protect the Union’s values and serve its
interests”), a group of states might take over responsibility. The creation of such
a group shall not affect another form of group building, i.e. permanent struc-
tured cooperation. The latter is conceptualized as a flexible approach and
“within the Union framework” (Art. 42 (6) TEU). The decision for establishing
permanent structured cooperation by the Council shall be taken by qualified
majority (Art. 46 (2) TEU).
4. Janis Emmanouilidis distinguishes six different forms of differentiation. See Janis A. Emmanoui-
lidis: Conceptualizing a Differentiated Europe. ELIAMEP Policy Paper No 10, June 2008, Athens.THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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The protocol (No. 10) concerning permanent structured cooperation calls upon
the member states to improve and harmonise their defence capabilities. This
could be interpreted as an attempt to increase integration in the field of security
and defence policy, but probably such a dynamic will depend on concrete steps
by the member states. It will be interesting to observe whether the High Repre-
sentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who will take up
important role in managing flexibility together with member states (Art. 44 and
Art. 46), can channel particular national interests in a common direction.
3. Conclusion
As in earlier reform phases a recurrent question remains to be answered: what
will be the effect of the new treaty? For those who are expecting the reconcilia-
tion of deepening and widening the Lisbon Treaty is probably not offering the
optimal solution. CFSP and CSDP will remain policy fields causing controver-
sial debates with regard to the degree to which they can be labelled ‘common’.
Even though the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union are legally on an equal level and even though the old
pillar structure will finally be overcome, the difference between the Community
part and the CFSP/CSDP part can still be recognized. Foreign, security and
defence policy will remain under the control of member states and intergovern-
mentalism will stay prominent. For the participating states it was and will be no
easy task to concretely move towards the sharing of sovereignty with other
states in these policy fields. Enhanced cooperation and permanent structured
cooperation offer an opportunity for more flexibility, however, it will be decisive
to see under which circumstances and with which commitment EU member
states will use it. What will happen if states do not use permanent structured
cooperation?
Against the background of the Irish referendum, a Europe of different integra-
tion density is becoming ever more probable. If a group inside the Union is in
general willing to move ahead and if this group is using flexibility instruments
like permanent structured cooperation, it will be even more interesting to
observe whether a kind core group for European foreign, security and defence
policy will become reality. Such a development would have far reaching effects
on the future course of the European integration process as a whole. A new
understanding would be necessary with regard to the terms ‘Union’ and ‘com-
mon’. And consequently, the debate about the EU as a global security actor,
being able to shape the behaviour of other actors, would need to be re-evalu-
ated.23
Permanent Command and Control Structures 
for the EU
JEAN-PAUL PERRUCHE5
1. The Political Perspective
After 5 years of operational existence the EU, through ESDP, has proved to be
an effective contributor to world stability and security. With 17 successful oper-
ations (5 of which military operations) on 3 continents – successful, because the
situation at the end of these operations was better than at the beginning – the
EU has become a global player whose action is appreciated and whose reputa-
tion as a peacekeeper is positive everywhere, even though for many reasons the
size of these operations was limited. The EU has become a partner of the UN,
NATO, the AU, and even ASEAN. These operations, launched under the EU
flag, were clearly beneficial to the EU and its member-states. Northern and east-
ern European countries have become familiar with African challenges, Ger-
many’s peacekeeping capacity is better known in the DRC and in Africa, Euro-
pean monitors are well known in Indonesia but also in Palestine, and neighbour-
ing countries on the Balkans are happy to see stabilisation pervading slowly but
surely thanks to the EU.
In view of the evolution of the security context and of the often reiterated US
request for more efforts on the part of the Europeans to increase their military
capabilities, the EU should definitely strive to do even more. There is a need for
the world to have Europe playing its role in achieving more security and stabil-
ity, just as there is a need for Europe to positively influence global stability by
intervening, even militarily, wherever the security situation is deteriorating.
In doing so, the EU, through ESDP, is not duplicating NATO. Although the
global security objectives of the two organisations are very close, they have their
own format, rationale and legitimacy to act for security. If one accepts that the
presence of the USA changes the definition of common interests and courses of
action to deal with crises, one must accept also that the two organisations need
to be able to act autonomously and require the appropriate structures to do so.
To put in synergy its multidisciplinary instruments, the EU needs appropriate
and specific command structures; it cannot rely on an external body, not even
partly. As both NATO and the EU rely on assets and capabilities provided by
5. Gen. (ret.) Jean-Paul Perruche is an international consultant, and is the former Director of the
EUMS. THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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their Member States the existence of two frameworks does not affect the avail-
ability of troops and resources – that availability is simply linked to the number
of crises – but rather offers to the Euro-Atlantic community a wider capacity to
intervene.
It is in this framework the need for the EU to be equipped with a permanent C2
structure must be considered.
2. The Military Perspective
2.1 The number and the diversity of ESDP operations 
require a solid command and control structure 
competent in all aspects of operations
When the structures of ESDP were defined, it was likely not expected that the
EU would launch 20 operations in 5 years (10 of which are ongoing). The
absence of a permanent operational chain of command led the EU to adopt a
specific command system for each operation. It is obvious that the EU now
needs a central command structure able to maintain a global situation aware-
ness with regard to all theatres in which the EU is engaged, and able to analyse,
to inform and to provide expertise for the political leaders. The new Watch Cen-
tre in the EUMS is a first step in the right direction but the EU needs a Joint
Operations Centre or Strategic Direction Centre to actually control all of its
operations.
2.2 The existing options for building an EU operational 
chain of command contain several drawbacks and are 
not indeed adapted to rapid response operations
Through the Berlin Plus Agreement, the EU can rely on the common assets and
capabilities of NATO, i.e. headquarters and communications. This arrangement
was successfully used twice, for Operation Concordia in the FYROM and Oper-
ation Althea in Bosnia. However, the difficulties posed by a parallel decision-
making process in the two organisations in the planning phase should not be
underestimated. This is a very time-consuming process; e.g. 8 months were nec-
essary for the hand over in Bosnia in 2004. In addition, it makes the EU depend-
ent on the agenda and decisions of non-EU members; the current Turkey-Cyprus
question can serve to illustrate this. Another difficulty results from the differ-
ences in approach and style between NATO and EU crisis management. The
multidisciplinary approach of the EU requires at the strategic level a command
structure able to embrace all the domains corresponding to the various instru-THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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ments committed by the EU. SHAPE is not able to provide this. Finally, based
on the author’s personal experience, in Berlin Plus operations it may be difficult
for the EUMS (which is the only EU source of military expertise) to stay in the
loop, while the operational commander (for Berlin Plus operations: DSACEUR)
may deal directly with the political leaders (the High Representative, DGE 8) or
other organisms of the Secretariat..
The framework nation option has been successfully used twice as well, for EU
autonomous operations in the DRC. However, it too is far from an ideal solu-
tion. Five nations have declared a national strategic military HQ available to be
multinationalised, upon request, for EU operations. Although preparatory
measures have been taken by the five to anticipate such an option, like dedicated
infrastructures and assets, training and earmarking of officers to join these HQs
in case of activation, the building phase is not easy. Many disturbances for the
lead nation (and to a lesser extent for contributing nations) result from double-
hatted officers leaving their national function. Contributing nations must find
the way to accommodate their people (including liaison teams) at the last
moment in one of the five host countries. In addition, the designation of the
selected operational commander and HQ is effective only after the approval of
the Joint Action, i.e. late in the planning process. When the designation is con-
firmed, the operational commander, far from Brussels, needs very strong sup-
port by the EUMS to catch up and get the necessary information to produce the
CONOPS and the OPLAN, while he must concurrently give directives to the
force commander and watch the building up of the HQ. The planning phase of
the operations EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR Chad provide a good illustra-
tion. Finally, another limit (rather more political) of the framework nation con-
cept is constituted by the burden of responsibility before the international com-
munity associated with lead nation status. No lead nation will accept to engage
in operations with a high level of risk and uncertainty on the duration of the
operation. Lebanon is a case in point.
The new Operations Centre at the EUMS enables the EU to build and equip an
operational chain of command in Brussels for autonomous operations of limited
size (2000 troops) at short notice (5 to 20 days), particularly in cases where a
joint civil-military response is required and no multinationalised national head-
quarters has been identified to conduct the operation. However, it is not a per-
manent structure. Infrastructure is prepared but staffing relies on earmarked
personnel from the EUMS, the Council General Secretariat and member states
who must join the Operations Centre in case of activation. This would have
serious consequences for the capacity of the EUMS (which should provide 40
officers) to fulfil its mission, in particular in the field of strategic or crisis
response planning.THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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2.3 Operational expertise is needed from the very outset of 
strategic planning and even in routine time
The delineation of information between the politico-military and the opera-
tional level is purely artificial. It is rather the exploitation of this information
which differs at each level. At the very beginning of the discussion about a stra-
tegic concept for EUFOR RD Congo, the EUMS had to send two fact finding
missions to Congo to inform the PSC ambassadors on tactical and sometimes
detailed aspects of the military situation. It is not realistic to think that decisions
may be taken about a strategic concept without good knowledge of the opera-
tional situation. It is an unnecessary handicap for the EU to be denied perma-
nent expertise in the operational area.
2.4 A permanent military strategic HQ in Brussels would be 
very cost-effective
Having all the bodies involved in the planning and running of an operation in
Brussels will make communication and cooperative work between them easier
and faster. A permanent StratHQ will further ensure the availability of opera-
tional expertise at any moment and will speed up the planning process. It will
alleviate the burden on framework nations and there will no longer be a need
for national liaison teams to OHQs.
2.5 The EU needs similar structures for commanding 
civilian, military and civilian-military operations
Since 2008, the EU is equipped with a comprehensive chain of command for
civilian operations (police and law enforcement) with a permanent operational
commander and HQ in Brussels: the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
(CPCC). As the EU seeks to develop its ability to integrate its civilian-mil crisis
management capabilities, it would be very effective to have symmetric structures
in the military area close at hand, making cooperation much easier.
3. Conclusion
The creation of a permanent military HQ at the strategic level would be very
beneficial to the EU and its credibility. It would be adapted to its level of ambi-
tion, it would enhance the visibility and credibility of ESDP operations, it would
be very cost effective, would make civilian-military cooperation much easier,
and would raise the quality of military expertise and facilitate EU planning.27
Permanent EU Command and 
Control Structures: 
A Capability Deficit to Be Addressed
ERICH HOCHLEITNER6
All EU crisis management operations conducted up to now have required the
setting up of ad hoc chains of command since the EU does not dispose of a
permanent military strategic command and control structure (OHQ). Strong
political and professional military reasons require the creation of a permanent
strategic C2 structure in Brussels. Denying the EU a permanent strategic C2
structure creates a self-inflicted and unnecessary handicap for the Union. It
reduces the military effectiveness of ESDP operations and their visibility. Also,
the global situation awareness with regard to all the theatres in which the EU is
engaged is not ensured.
The broad support expressed by EU defence ministers for the idea of establish-
ing a permanent capability for planning of military operations within the EUMS
at their informal meeting in Wiesbaden in March 2007 can be considered as an
important starting point to address the problems the EU is facing in planning
and conducting EU operations. But the result of negotiations among EU states
was so far very modest because of a continuing lack of political support for an
autonomous ESDP by some member states. Against this background, available
structures will first be analysed. Second, the case for a permanent strategic C2
structure to be established in Brussels will be examined.
1. Available Planning and Command Structures 
for EU Operations
At present the EU has three options to plan and run crisis management opera-
tions: using NATO structures, one of the five HQs of EU framework nations
(UK, France, Germany, Italy, Greece) or the newly created Operations Centre.
Having no permanent operational planning and command capability at strate-
gic level the EU must discuss and negotiate the establishment of an ad hoc oper-
ational chain of command with NATO and EU-Framework nations on a case by
case basis. This is of course time-consuming.
6. Ambassador (ret.) Dr. Erich Hochleitner is Director of the Austrian Institute for European and
Security Policy. He has been Ambassador to the WEU and NATO. THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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NATO structures have been built up and organised to plan and command
NATO military operations in the area of defence and more recently also of crisis
management. If NATO is requested by the EU to provide an OHQ it would not
be sufficient just to put an EU label on existing NATO structures, but within the
existing NATO chains of command, an ad hoc command chain needs to be
negotiated and organised. In the case of operation Althea in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, EU-NATO negotiations took over 8 months. In case of a necessary rapid
response, e.g. rapid deployment of an EU Battlegroup, it is obvious that the
Berlin Plus option for an OHQ would not work. Furthermore, NATO does not
have civil instruments in house. NATO is therefore not equipped to run EU-type
comprehensive civil/military operations. The NATO approach is CIMIC, which
means organising military cooperation with available civil actors in the theatre.
Using NATO means could also in certain situations be politically difficult.
Finally, NATO means might not be available or their use blocked by a member
state as the EU has experienced in the past and still experiences.
As regards the use of EU framework nation HQs, standards for equipment,
manning and procedures for EU-OHQ have been defined by the EU and are
implemented by framework nations. But also national OHQ need to be acti-
vated, augmented and multinationalised within a time frame of 20 days in order
to be fully operational. The key nucleus of the OHQ provided by the frame-
works nations varies from 42 to 46 personnel. The permanent nucleus available
for EU staff work exclusively are 15 persons in Potsdam, 9 in Cento Celle, sub-
stantial less (2-4) at Mont Valerien and Northwood. The majority of the key
nucleus is double hatted staff immediately transferable to the activated OHQ.
CIS facilities are prepared and the staffs of the key nucleus and augmentees are
earmarked. Nevertheless official work of the OHQ can only start when the deci-
sion designating the OHQ is taken. This also means time. National HQs do not
have civil-military competences either. National parent headquarters continue
to have other national, alliance and coalition roles to fulfil and will only bear
the bleeding involved in running an EU operation for operations of clearly lim-
ited duration. The idea that one EU country bears the burden for providing an
OHQ is not compatible with the concept of fair burden-sharing.
The new Operations Centre at the EUMS enables the EU to build and equip an
operational chain of command for autonomous operations at short notice in
Brussels, particularly in cases where a joint civil/military response is required
and no multinationalised national HQ has been identified to conduct the oper-
ation. However, the EU Operations Centre is not a permanent structure. It can
be activated within 5 days achieving full operational capability within 20 days
for operations of up to 2000 soldiers. Infrastructure is prepared and personnel
from the EU Military Staff, Council General Secretariat and member states haveTHE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
29
been earmarked to work at the Operations Centre. But the present construction
of activating the Operations Centre would bring about the temporary destruc-
tion of the EUMS, which is a matter of concern. There would not be sufficient
staff available for other important staff-work such a military strategic contin-
gency planning, crisis response strategic planning etc.
2. The case for establishing a permanent strategic 
planning and conduct capability in Brussels
The experience of EU operations clearly demonstrates that the lack of a perma-
nent strategic C2 structure has become a capability-shortfall affecting and lim-
iting the effectiveness and the credibility of EU operations. Several arguments
speak in favour of creating such a C2 structure on a strategic level:
Duplication
The argument to avoid unnecessary duplication is neither convincing nor valid.
Given the civil/military focus of the EU, a permanent strategic EU C2 structure
in Brussels would not duplicate anything that exists elsewhere. Such a capability
does neither exist in NATO nor in available national HQs.
Structuring the operational strategic level
Having no permanent structure at the operational military strategic level
reduces the competence of the EU to plan and conduct military operations at
that level, which affects the EU´s effectiveness and credibility. When launching
an operation, the credibility of the action relies first on the credibility of the
chain of command, i.e. the capability for the upper layer to assess and control
at any time what the subordinate layers are doing. Therefore a clear military
need for a permanent structure at the operational strategic level exists. Such a
capability would allow a better implementation of the concept of Effects-Based
Operations Planning. Such a capability needs to be located in Brussels in order
to ensure that the military implications of political options and decisions are
effectively translated and communicated to political leaders.
Improving arrangements for preparation, planning and conduct 
of operations
Lessons learned from EUFOR RD Congo demonstrate that arrangements for
preparation, planning and conduct of EU military operations need to beTHE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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improved. The translation of directives, from the political to the military level,
was made difficult by an existing gap in the military planning process. The need
for an OHQ in the phase immediately preceding the decision to deploy, was felt
strongly by the Council Secretariat and EUMS because a number of questions
related to the OHQ were raised by political decision-makers and there was no
OHQ yet designated. Also the force generation process was faced with difficul-
ties due to the lack of sufficiently precise military data. There were also prob-
lems related to timely information of all EU member states about essential mil-
itary characteristics of the operation under preparation. Some member states
insisted on running their own reconnaissance missions to the Congo, resulting
in a series of European delegations asking the same questions and sowing con-
fusion.
Conceptual inconsistency
The 2010 Headline Goal`s declared responsiveness target for Battlegroup
deployment in the theatre is ten days. That is incompatible with the time to
negotiate the choice of an OHQ, its multinationalisation and the time necessary
for planning. It is inconsistent to develop a Battlegroup concept to be able to
deploy force rapidly far away and rely on a case by case basis for providing an
operational chain of command.
Supporting a comprehensive approach
The comprehensive EU-approach to crisis management, trying to join up the
various civilian and military instruments into coherent policies and actions, is a
strong case to plan and conduct also the military part of an operation from
Brussels, keeping in mind that the EU has substantial non-military instruments
at its disposal which are becoming more and more important for successful cri-
sis-management. Most of these tools are managed by Brussels institutions. The
establishment of a permanent military C2 structure on a strategic level would be
an important contribution to enhance the EU comprehensive approach and
would allow the EU to respond faster and better to the increasing demand for
comprehensive civil-military action in the area of crisis-management. Such a
permanent military structure would complement the already established Civil-
ian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in Brussels and make the EU more
capable to implement its comprehensive approach in crisis management.THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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Overseeing and coordinating EU operations
No connection is so far established between different operations allowing cen-
tralised management from Brussels. There is an increasing need for a capacity to
watch, command and control the various concurrent EU operations from cen-
tral HQ in Brussels, because the present situation running a greater number in
an unconnected way is not sustainable.
Including smaller member states
The present system of using five framework-nation HQs as EU-OHQ presents
a major difficulty for smaller EU countries, whose staffing constraints are con-
siderable. It is indeed difficult for most of the smaller countries to send perma-
nent liaison officers to five HQs, which would ensure their full involvement in
EU crisis-management and give them full and timely information about essential
military characteristics of the operation which is prepared and in which they
should be able to take part. With the same number of officers, smaller states
would be able to contribute substantially to a permanent multinational OHQ.
The creation of a permanent strategic C2 structure in Brussels would make it
easier for smaller member states to be represented and play a role in ESDP mil-
itary operations.
Strengthening institutional memory
The current system, whereby the responsibility for planning and conduct of an
operation is passed from one framework-nation to another, means that the expe-
rience gathered during the previous operations is not retained in the EU for
operational learning as it should be. The EU´s lack of a permanent operational
planning and command structure means that the institutional memory and les-
sons learned at the military operational level will likely be lost every time a new
OHQ is designated. There is a strong argument in favour of setting up a perma-
nent staff of planning officers, particularly given that greater experience means
also shorter lead times.
Using synergies
A permanent strategic C2 structure would create synergies for the development
of an EU strategic culture as advocated in the European Security Strategy. This
would also allow the development of a more coherent European military and
operational culture and strengthen understanding, trust and solidarity among
European military. However, there is no need to reinvent anything within the EUTHE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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in terms of standards and concepts, which already exist in NATO, but it would
be important that NATO makes them available to the Union and all its mem-
bers.
Cost effectiveness
A permanent strategic C2 structure would allow a better pooling of resources
and fairer burden-sharing of costs among EU members than the present system.
The cost argument against creating EU operational planning and command
structures is not valid. In designing a permanent EU planning and command
structure, the EU would not need a structure commensurate with NATO’s due
to its lower level of ambition. CIS equipment exists already to a large extent. The
placing of 60-80 people in an operations centre in or near Brussels should be
easily affordable for the EU.
Better visibility of EU operations
A permanent strategic military C2 structure in form of an EU-OHQ, which
could also be called an EU Mission HQ, would increase the visibility of any EU
operation on the international level but also increase the visibility of EU opera-
tions with the European citizens, which support the development of ESDP with
a great majority.
Improving emergency response
Permanent military C2 structures could also be used to assist in implementing
the ‘solidarity clause’ in cases such as multiple severe terrorist attacks or other
major emergencies. Attempts to prepare an EU information network for emer-
gencies have so far not found support. Emergencies as foreseen in the solidarity
clause make an immediate response necessary. The military role is most impor-
tant in the first 24 hours after the incident. Planning, preparedness and com-
mand structures would have to be designed accordingly, and there would be
demanding requirements on access, mobility, information, communication,
vehicles and force protection.33
The Future of Defence Planning – 
A NATO Perspective
HEINRICH BRAUSS7
The Treaty of Lisbon has been designed to enhance the European Union’s coher-
ence and its ability to act. Thus, it also encompasses important provisions on the
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) including the establishment of a
Permanent Structured Cooperation of nations in the field of defence transfor-
mation.8 It appears that this concept particularly aims at committing participat-
ing member states to transforming their forces and capabilities more vigorously;
enhancing their availability, deployability, and interoperability for operations;
contributing in multinational forces and major joint equipment programmes;
and, thus, strengthening the common European industrial and technological
base. All these features, as well as the prominent role the European Defence
Agency is supposed to play in implementing this permanent structured cooper-
ation, seem to suggest the constitution of a comprehensive, coherent and inter-
dependent approach to the development of military capabilities and defence
capacities in the EU. Thus, it appears that the Permanent Structured Coopera-
tion strives to achieve in essence much of what capabilities development within
the NATO framework is also seeking. The central question for both the EU’s
and NATO’s capabilities development processes is how to drive transformation
of nations’ forces and capabilities to cope with the manifold challenges of inter-
national crisis management today and in the future.
NATO Defence Planning
NATO’s approach to capability development represents an integrative process
complemented by multinational initiatives and projects. Its purpose is to facili-
tate the timely development and delivery of the necessary range of forces and
capabilities that are interoperable and adequately trained, equipped and sup-
ported to undertake the Alliance’s full spectrum of missions, while being respon-
sive to current and future operational requirements. It seeks to provide a coher-
ent framework within which national defence planning can be harmonised so as
to meet the Alliance’s agreed requirements in the most effective way.
7. Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Policy and Planning, International Staff, NATO. 
8. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Community, Section 2, Article 28 and the Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation
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It is clear that the basic approaches to driving nations’ capability development
are by and large the same in NATO and the EU. In both cases, overall require-
ments are determined based on political guidance on the scope, scale and nature
of possible future engagements involving military means, and on planning sce-
narios. The required capabilities have to be provided by nations. Their contri-
butions are reviewed, which results in the identification of shortfalls that need
to be remedied by nations over time. In NATO the agreed requirements are
drawn primarily from two sources: The first is NATO’s Comprehensive Political
Guidance, which was endorsed by Heads of State and Government in Riga 2006
and sets out the Alliance’s top priority qualitative capability requirements:
– Multinational joint expeditionary forces and the capability to deploy and
sustain them for extended periods;
– High readiness forces;
– The ability to deal with asymmetric threats;
– Information superiority;
– The ability to bring military support to stabilisation operations and recon-
struction efforts, to security sector reform and to humanitarian relief opera-
tions; and
– The ability to draw together NATO’s instruments as well as the ability to
effectively coordinate with other actors.
The second is the Ministerial Guidance 2006 which sets out NATO’s capability
requirements in quantitative terms, i.e. the Alliance’s Level of Ambition (LoA) –
the so called 2 plus 6 formula, which means that the Alliance has the ambition
to be able to conduct two Major Joint Operations and six Smaller Joint Opera-
tions concurrently. It should be noted that the LoA is not to be prescriptive as
to the number and scale of possible future operations the Alliance will conduct.
It is rather a tool, indeed NATO’s key defence planning tool, intended to deter-
mine the overall level of forces and capabilities required. It is worth noting that
Allied contributions to EU-led operations would count against the overall
demands of the Alliance’s LoA, which is an implicit recognition of NATO’s and
the EU’s complementary efforts.
Of perhaps particular relevance, however, are the differences in the EU’s capa-
bility planning as it has been conducted hitherto. NATO assigns many defence
planning targets to nations on the basis of the principles of fair burden-sharing
and reasonable challenge for any individual nation,9 and later it proceeds to
conduct a detailed evaluation of national efforts and proposed contributions.
Both these steps are carried out and agreed in multilateral fora and with maxi-
9. It is of course up to the sovereign individual nations to accept the assigned force goals as plan-
ning targets for their national plans and to which extent they are willing to fulfill those targets.THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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mum visibility and transparency amongst participating Allies. This is in clear
contrast to the EU, which essentially seeks voluntary contributions to meet its
stated defence planning requirements and, until recently, has not engaged in
multilateral assessments of individual national contributions. Additionally, the
cyclical nature of NATO’s defence review process has brought about permanent,
institutionalised mutual information and consultation which has over time cre-
ated a sense of collective ownership and enduring commitment. Looking to the
key elements of the Permanent Structured Cooperation – more binding commit-
ments, higher criteria for military capabilities, regular assessments and annual
reports by the European Defence Agency – it appears as if the two approaches
were converging in the future.
Against this background, various other elements regarding NATO defence plan-
ning may be of interest. First, NATO defence planning aims to influence and
facilitate nations’ efforts to develop the requisite capabilities, be those efforts
pursued nationally, multinationally or collectively. Hence, to be effective,
defence planning needs to secure the full buy-in from the nations and to com-
mand and sustain high-level political attention and support in capitals. In this
respect, NATO defence planning has yielded mixed results. On the one hand,
many nations consider NATO’s approach to defence planning as one of the Alli-
ance’s unique achievements. Its specific strengths10 have certainly considerably
promoted the transformation of a number of Allies’ forces and have supported
defence reform in numerous Partner and accession countries. On the other hand,
NATO’s attempts to address the new challenges that have emerged since the end
of the Cold War have not lived up to expectations. In many European nations
the process of transformation has been and remains slow.
Indeed, even special, ad hoc, initiatives complementary to the systematic, long-
term approach of NATO’s defence planning and specifically designed to capture
high-level political support and to generate some short-term impetus on devel-
oping strategic enabling capabilities, such as the 1999 Defence Capabilities Ini-
tiative (DCI) and the 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), have deliv-
ered only a relatively small number of additional capabilities beyond what was
already in national plans. NATO has continued to wrestle with this perennial
challenge, including by means of establishing usability targets and setting up the
multinational NATO Response Force (NRF), just to highlight two of a series of
initiatives. Again: mixed results. 
10. These strengths are the rigorous planning system with sound underpinnings, accurate identifi-
cation of requirements, comprehensive assessments, regular reporting, transparency etc.THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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So far, more than ten nations are not yet meeting the 40% target for deployable
forces, and a number of Allies are still below the 8% target for sustainable
forces.11 The NRF has undoubtedly served as a catalyst for the wider transfor-
mation of Alliance forces and this function is particularly appreciated by the
new Allies. However, NATO has continually faced difficulties in generating the
forces for the various NRF rotations due to the high operational tempo in
Afghanistan, Kosovo and in Iraq. It will be interesting to observe the EU’s expe-
rience in sustaining high-value, highly expensive standing multinational forma-
tions on stand-by such as the EU Battlegroups.
An essential reason for the challenges we face is the fact that transformation
does not come cheap; it requires sustained political will and funding. Many
nations spend less than 2% of the Gross Domestic Product on defence, a marker
established in NATO’s 2006 Ministerial Guidance; just as many fail to reach the
marker for major equipment expenditure (20% of the defence expenditure).
Most nations, however, need to increase their defence expenditure to be able to
continue contributing to challenging real world operations while at the same
time transforming and modernising their armed forces. Certainly, any collective
defence planning needs to take account of the realities within nations. If they are
not going to spend more, they need to spend better. As one means to help achieve
this, defence planning efforts need to focus on the most important capability
shortfalls rather than on meeting all possible requirements; redirecting scarce
resources allocated to maintaining legacy military structures into higher priority
capability areas; and encouraging nations that cannot afford the acquisition of
key enabling capabilities by themselves to participate in multinational pro-
grammes.
Review of NATO’s Defence Planning Processes
Defence planning, by its nature, focuses on the mid- and especially long-term,
because that is the period over which research and industry can be guided and
significant changes can be effected. Collective defence planning cannot achieve
miracles just as nations cannot make dramatic changes to their procurement
programmes and implement new structures overnight. Nevertheless, efficient
defence planning needs to be more responsive to new requirements, be they the
result of lessons identified in operations (e.g. helicopters) or analysis of the
future security challenges (e.g. cyber defence and ballistic missile defence and,
11. The usability targets are political by nature and designed to give impetus to nations’ defence
transformation. “Deployable forces” are those land forces that are structured, prepared and
equipped for deployed operations; “sustainable forces” are that percentage of the overall land force
strength that can be sustained on deployed operations or high readiness standby.THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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on the other hand, support to security sector reform, capacity and institution-
building) or emerging technology opportunities; it needs to provide the linkages
between long-term capability guidance and short/mid-term requirements; it
should support effective multinational solutions; and it has to be flexible enough
to get inside the defence programme decision loops of nations.
To contribute to all this, the Alliance is currently conducting a fundamental
review of its defence planning processes. In NATO, there are a number of plan-
ning disciplines12 supporting numerous Council and subordinate committees as
well as a number of civilian and military bodies dealing with various aspects of
development and use of military capabilities. This poses challenges for coordi-
nation and harmonisation, in particular with a view to shortfall management,
addressing complex future requirements and strengthening the industrial and
technological base within a coherent framework. The review therefore seeks to
enhance internal coherence and coordination both at staff and committee level.
The current studies focus on streamlining and simplifying the process; address-
ing key capability shortfalls rather than numerous detailed requirements;
enhancing coherence across the planning disciplines and bodies through estab-
lishment of Capability Coordinators or Project Managers for key capabilities;
improving political-military coherence through harmonisation or even integra-
tion of civilian and military staffs; and entrusting a Senior Council Advisory
Committee with monitoring and supervising coherent capabilities development.
The current multinational helicopter initiatives both within NATO and the EU
are a case in point for short and mid-term shortfall management through multi-
national efforts supported by centralised staff and committee overview and
coordination. For crisis response operations deployed at strategic distance, in
large areas and austere environments helicopters have turned out to be a key
enabler for maintaining situation awareness, ensuring flexibility and rapid
response in theatre, and, thus, operational effectiveness and success. Although
there are enough helicopters in nations’ inventories, both NATO and the EU are
lacking sufficient mission-capable helicopters in respectively Afghanistan and
Chad. Both initiatives focus therefore on pragmatic multinational efforts geared
to providing assistance to improving the availability of helicopters in operations
in the short and mid-term, such as technical upgrades, refurbishments, setting
up of multinational logistical bases in theatre, training of crews and multina-
tional funding. It is clear that this top priority requirement demands full trans-
parency and close coordination and cooperation between the EU and NATO.
12. Force planning; armaments planning; logistics planning; operational planning; standardisation;
air defence planning; nuclear planning, and civil emergency planning. THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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Defence Planning and the Provision of Forces
Defence Planning provides the indispensable prerequisite for force generation,
but it is not its substitute. Whatever form of defence procedures we might end
up with, ultimately it is nations that decide what capabilities they develop,
whether to declare them to an international organisation and, most relevant
these days, whether to deploy them for a specific operation. Despite the desire
of some Allies, collective defence planning cannot guarantee the delivery of
capabilities for specific ongoing operations nor is it the panacea for force gener-
ation. Yes, in NATO it does seek to ensure that, collectively, the Alliance has all
the necessary capabilities to fulfil its Level of Ambition. However, the latter is
unlikely to be the silver bullet everyone is seeking, to encourage nations to pro-
vide considerably more capabilities. Yes, NATO seeks to encourage, facilitate
and, occasionally, even cajole nations to contribute capabilities for ongoing
operations, but the decision to deploy specific capabilities from that pool is and
will remain the sovereign right of individual Allies. It is all about political will
and public support.
The following figures might illustrate this fundamental fact: 76,000 – that is the
number of land forces needed to sustain current NATO operations and for
mounting NATO’s stand-by forces. 285,000 – that is the number of land forces
NATO nations need to sustain their operational commitments and other high-
readiness missions, i.e. for NATO, the EU, the UN, the Iraq coalition, and
national purposes. The last figure is 2,349,000 – that is the number of land
forces reported by NATO Allies. In conclusion, nations have more than eight
times the land forces required to sustain the present overall operational tempo.
Given such figures, we should not have a problem. But we do. In Afghanistan
and in Chad, NATO and the EU are finding it a challenge to pull together the
necessary forces, in particular the key enablers, such as mission-capable helicop-
ters, although numerically there are more than enough in nations’ inventories.
Both NATO and the EU are struggling to address the dwindling political will of
nations to provide the necessary forces and capabilities for operations. It would
seem that many nations are only willing to commit to a far distant crisis man-
agement operation that is assessed to be feasible and affordable – in terms of
political support, military risk and financial burden. It appears that to better
meet this concern a comprehensive political-military concept is required before
any operation is decided and launched; underpinned by an unambiguous under-
standing of the objective, a realistic idea of the capabilities and costs required;
realistic conditions for termination of the mission; and a plain rationale which
can be explained to the public. The Comprehensive Strategic Politico-MilitaryTHE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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Campaign Plan for Afghanistan adopted by NATO and its partners at the 2008
Bucharest Summit is expected to make a difference in this regard.
NATO-EU Cooperation in Capability Development
In terms of military capability development and defence transformation both
NATO and the EU are basically encumbered by the same problems. And it is
generally the European nations that lack usable capabilities required for expe-
ditionary operations, both in NATO and in the EU. On the other hand, every
nation has only one set of forces and capabilities, from which it draws to supply
operations conducted in various international or multinational frameworks, be
it NATO, the EU, the UN or a coalition of nations. In this context, it is worth
considering the implications of the fact that currently 21 European nations are
members of both the EU and NATO; and there are four more EU member states
(Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) that are participating in NATO’s pro-
gramme Partnership for Peace and that, through the Planning And Review Proc-
ess (PARP),13 are affiliated with the capability development within the NATO
framework. A fifth nation, Malta, may join PARP in due course. As a conse-
quence, it is safe to say that 25 (or perhaps 26, if Malta participates in PARP)
out of 27 EU member states are taking part in NATO’s approach to capabilities
development. Conversely, there are 21 plus five ‘double-hatted’ NATO Allies
that are involved in the ESDP capability development process. 
13. PARP constitutes a mechanism by which NATO provides assistance to defence planning and
capability development of its PfP Partners.THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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As a consequence, it is clear that enhanced EU defence planning, including
through the envisaged Permanent Structured Cooperation, leading to more usa-
ble European forces and capabilities, would also significantly strengthen
NATO’s ability to act. Conversely, a coordinated capability development of the
21 EU NATO nations plus four EU member states participating in the PARP
towards the priorities laid down in NATO’s Comprehensive Political Guidance
and towards the usability targets would equally serve the EU’s ability to act.
Thus, this constellation suggests and, indeed, strongly recommends, a coordi-
nated and harmonised, if not joint, approach to (military) capability develop-
ment of all European nations. The appropriate framework and procedures
would need to be examined in detail.
In any event, the overlapping membership of so many European nations in
NATO and EU suggests the enhancement of efforts already undertaken in this
regard. Since 2002/3 there has been a mutually agreed framework for “coherent,
transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the capability require-
ments” common to the EU and NATO. Due to many reasons, including differ-
ing political views about the scope, framework and nature of EU-NATO coop-
eration, its potential has not yet been fully exploited. There is no blueprint for
the future EU-NATO cooperation, but the ‘rapprochement’ of France towards
NATO’s military structures and the greater US support for ESDP, including its
military dimension, have the potential to serve as catalysts for improvements in
the cooperation of the two organisations. The statements made of late on the
future of the EU-NATO relationship by both French President Sarkozy and US
President Bush have been encouraging in this regard. In Bucharest the latter
underlined that the US welcomed a strong EU as a partner of the US and NATO
in tackling the international challenges, building upon their different strengths.
On the other hand, one has to recognise that, sadly, sweeping progress in the
NATO-EU relationship is not likely to be achieved in the foreseeable future.
Apart from the successful EU-NATO military cooperation in Bosnia-Herze-
govina under the Berlin-Plus arrangement, the formal cooperation at the politi-
cal level has actually been blocked. This is due to the Turkish-Cypriot dispute
and, on the other hand, Turkey’s relationship with and expectations of the EU.14
The situation is putting at risk operational success in challenging theatres, such
as Kosovo and Afghanistan, where NATO military operations (KFOR and
ISAF) and EU civilian missions (EULEX and EUPOL) are operating side-by side,
and it is also affecting the implementation of a comprehensive approach to crisis
14. TU insists, inter alia, that every NATO-EU activity has to be consistent with the “Framework
Agreement” of 2002/3, which excludes Cyprus, since this country has no security agreement with
NATO. On the other hand, the EU has not agreed to a security agreement with Turkey, nor to an
administrative arrangement between the European Defence Agency and Turkey. THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
41
management. The resolution of the deadlock is therefore a strategic challenge in
the coming months requiring a concerted effort of our nations’ top political
level.
For the time being, however, there is no alternative but to exploit to their full
potential the opportunities provided by the mutually agreed framework, prima-
rily in the NATO-EU Capability Group and in staff-to-staff contacts between
the key players in the respective NATO and EU capability development bodies,
i.e. the EU General Secretariat, the European Defence Agency, the NATO Head-
quarters staffs and the Allied Command Transformation.43
Conference Report
EVA STRICKMANN15
Session 1: Europe’s Military Ambition
The question of its military ambition should guide Europe’s defence efforts –
regardless of whether Europeans act within the EU, NATO or the UN. While the
2003 European Security Strategy states that ‘the EU is inevitably a global player’
and ‘should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security’, the EU
lacks a (civil-)military strategy defining its level of ambition.
In the first session, the panellists discussed Europe’s changed security environ-
ment, due to new threats and a new (im)balance of power on the international
scene. Moreover, the role, structural characteristics and priorities of the EU and
other global actors were compared. The civil-military comprehensive approach
of the EU in crisis management was considered an advantage over the tools of
other global actors and organisations. Also, the achievements of the EU (long
history of peace and the process of European integration) were underlined.
However, to become a more credible and efficient actor in international crisis
management and to realise its military ambitions, the panellists agreed that the
EU should focus on the following objectives:
1. Creation of permanent EU command & control structures, which is crucial
for the planning of operations, strategic awareness, decision-making process
and coordination between EU member states.
2. Development and harmonisation of European capabilities plus increased
defence spending, with a view to:
– the increased commitment and military expenditures of other global players;
– an analysis of the EU’ strategic shortfalls not only based on current situ-
ations and mission scenarios (i.e. what will Europe need in 25 years?);
– the pooling of assets of all EU member states;
– the idea to hold a capability organisation conference;
– the willingness of the EU member states to revise their national defence
planning process.
3. Fairer burden-sharing mechanisms, through coordination by the European
Defence Agency (EDA).
15. Eva Strickmann is a research fellow at AIES.THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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4. Definition of an EU level of ambition, with regard to:
– the military ability, instruments, intensity of operations, geographical
horizon;
– the political will to effectively launch operations.
5. Better cooperation with NATO and other partners, with an emphasis on:
– the development of efficient partnership agreements,
– enhanced coordination and information-sharing in common theatres of
operation (Balkans, Afghanistan).
6. Better exchange of military and civilian expertise within the EU, with a view
to:
– integrating the EU’s tools in the field of crisis management;
– strengthening the EU’s comprehensive approach.
7. Overcome the ‘information deficit’ of the European public
– to communicate the political rationales of the EU;
– to increase public support for the development of ESDP.
Soft or hard power?
It was controversially discussed whether the EU should – given its modest
resources and limited political will – focus on soft power and leave the ‘hard job’
to NATO. One argument was that Europeans need to be ready to deal with new
realities in the geo-political environment (e.g. demographic challenges) and that
the EU cannot afford to choose limited scenarios only. Thus, the EU would need
to learn how to act efficiently on all levels (political, strategic, operational, tac-
tical). Moreover, EU member states would need to consider the nature of their
armed forces and make them available for all levels of operations. The EU
should find a way to overcome the lip service and hesitance of its member states
and provide incentives for the transformation of European armed forces. There
was general agreement that the EU has the responsibility to be ready for every
possible conflict scenario and that the Lisbon Treaty facilitates the interpreta-
tion of the Petersberg tasks.
Rapid response
Subsequently, the EU’s tools in the field of rapid response were discussed. It was
agreed that the current EU Battlegroup 1500 concept is not useable and should
be abandoned. Instead, the EU should move towards creating more capable
rapid reaction ground force units (of 5000-6000 troops) and include air and
maritime rapid response assets. A new rapid response concept would be crucial
to meet the challenge of (1) generating and deploying a force within a shortTHE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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period of time, (2) being ready for both low- and high-intensity operations and
(3) employing force effectively.
In order to create leaner, stronger and better trained armed forces, the EU should
also maintain close cooperation and interoperability with the United States, pro-
mote a common EU defence culture and find a way to deal with political ambi-
guities and national caveats (e.g. not block the deployment of an EU Battlegroup
as this was the case with the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) in Northwood/
UK during the force generation process for EUFOR Chad/CAR).
Session 2: Added Value through Permanent Structured 
Cooperation
The Treaty of Lisbon foresees a new mechanism in the field of European Security
and Defence Policy (to be renamed ‘Common Security and Defence Policy’):
‘Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and
which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a
view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured coop-
eration within the Union framework’ (Art. 42 § 6 TEU). Therefore, as soon as
the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, Permanent Structured Cooperation pro-
vides those EU member states which are willing and able with a possibility to
establish closer defence cooperation.
Functional details for Permanent Structured Cooperation are stipulated in Arti-
cle 46 TEU and a number of criteria are identified in the attached Protocol No.
10 on Permanent Structured Cooperation. According to the provisions of Art.
46 §§ 1-6 TEU, member states wishing to participate in Permanent Structured
Cooperation shall inform the EU Council and the High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Within three months from notifi-
cation, the EU Council shall decide by qualified majority on the framework for
cooperation and the participating EU member states. The Treaty of Lisbon also
foresees the possibilities that further member states may join Permanent Struc-
tured Cooperation at a later stage or that the participation of member states can
be suspended.
– Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation lay
out the following criteria for member states to participate – without defining
concrete figures or benchmarks:
– Intensive development of defence capacities through increased participation
in multinational forces, European equipment programmes and through
cooperation with the EDA;THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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– being able to commit troops with support elements to an EU Battlegroup by
2010 at the latest;
– agree on and fulfil objectives concerning the level of investment expenditure
on defence equipment;
– harmonisation of military needs through pooling and, where appropriate,
specialisation;
– enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and interoperability of
the member states’ armed forces by defining common objectives for force
commitment;
– strengthen multinational approaches and address the shortfalls identified
through the ‘Capability Development Mechanism’.
Article 3 of the Protocol underlines that the EDA shall play a central role within
the framework of Permanent Structured Cooperation by giving a regular assess-
ment of the participating member states’ contributions and fulfilment of agreed
criteria.16
Given that the stipulations on the establishment and functioning of Permanent
Structured Cooperation in the Treaty of Lisbon are vague, the potential of Per-
manent Structured Cooperation was intensively discussed during Session 2. A
number of central questions were raised: first, should Permanent Structured
Cooperation be inclusive or exclusive? Second, what are the possible criteria for
the new mechanism? Third, if the latter is the case, which EU member states
could possibly form a core group?
Inclusive or exclusive concept?
One opinion was that Permanent Structured Cooperation should be an inclusive
concept, providing for as many EU member states as possible to participate.
This argumentation referred to the discussions in the European Convention in
2002 and the fears that an exclusive concept might provoke deep divisions
within the EU. A core group of some member states (e.g. including the ‘Big Six’:
France, the UK, Germany, Spain, Italy and Poland) would ignore the potential
of smaller EU member states and undermine the spirit of European integration.
Also, exclusiveness would threaten public support for ESDP in the non-partici-
pating member states. The proponents underlined that an inclusive approach
would allow for greater synergies and effects of scale and result in more added
16. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (2008/C 115/01), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
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value for the EU. Therefore, the ideal case would be to integrate all 27 EU mem-
ber states in the Permanent Structured Cooperation mechanism.
Others argued that an inclusive approach to Permanent Structured Cooperation
would risk being ineffective: if all member states were encouraged to participate,
it would be difficult to set the bar high enough and ask for additional efforts and
commitments. Thus, the mechanism of Permanent Structured Cooperation
might not lead to any improvement and the EU would miss its objective of
increased cooperation in the field of ESDP. Also, it would be a technical chal-
lenge to get all 27 member states together. Furthermore, the opponents of an
inclusive approach stressed that it would be crucial to look at the motivation of
EU member states to join Permanent Structured Cooperation, before assuming
that anybody would want to be involved. The limited political will of some EU
member states was considered a main problem: Some member states sign up to
certain commitments but do not implement the agreed measures. It was empha-
sised that, while it is for some member states (structurally) impossible to meet a
number of criteria, it is a question of political choice for the majority of EU
member states. Moreover, the concept of exclusiveness would not be a question
of smaller or larger EU member states, given that for instance Sweden spends
25% within the defence budget on investment.
There is an inherent tension between legitimacy and effectiveness of Permanent
Structured Cooperation and there was agreement that the main challenge would
be to define the largest possible group of EU member states that could still
deliver the desired results (i.e. generate a higher percentage of deployable armed
forces). Choosing a possible core group was therefore considered a very difficult
task.
Defining criteria
How can a substantial commitment of EU member states – leading to more
available capabilities and faster transformation of the armed forces – be guaran-
teed? To this end, it was discussed how the provisions of Article 2 of the Protocol
could be translated into concrete criteria for additional efforts.
It was agreed that the aim should be to define realistic criteria for participation
in Permanent Structured Cooperation. Instead of calling for an increased
defence budget of 2% of GDP (which would lead to Permanent Structured
Cooperation between France, the UK, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania only) or
40% of deployable and 8% of sustainable troops, the EU should focus on
achievable and flexible goals. However, these should be precise, have an impactTHE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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and be applicable to the EU member states’ specific (and available) capabilities.
Permanent Structured Cooperation should also allow for extra contributions
and stimulate cooperation between member states – with overlapping clusters
and different ways of collaboration. Moreover, it was emphasised that the crite-
ria need to be output-oriented. The proposed approach would focus on possible
tasks of member states within Permanent Structured Cooperation and the sum
of total capabilities needed. This would necessitate an assessment of how many
capabilities are available and could additionally be made available in the future
and imply the setting of deadlines. The process should be driven and supported
by the EDA.
Furthermore, it was cautioned that the EU needs to define its underlying objec-
tives (level of ambition) in the field of ESDP: What does it mean for the EU to
contribute to peace and stability? Why should the EU strengthen its capabilities?
What does the EU aim to achieve (e.g. fulfilment of Petersberg tasks)? One argu-
ment underlined that the 2003 European Security Strategy has not been trans-
lated into a military sub-strategy and proposed that an EU civilian-military
strategy should be discussed with a view to updating the European Security
Strategy.
Pooling
Moreover, it was agreed that pooling forces and assets would be crucial for the
success of Permanent Structured Cooperation. One idea would be to create a
joint fighter capacity (replacing the F-16s of some member states) with inte-
grated command & control. Moreover, it was stressed that pooling could
increase the sovereignty of EU member states, allowing smaller member states
to participate in large-scale operations.
Conclusion
There was consent that Permanent Structured Cooperation, if effectively and
efficiently used as a platform by EU member states, could help breaking the gap
between Brussels rhetoric and practice and could be a useful approach to deepen
European defence integration. Crucial steps would be:
1. to think about the objectives of Permanent Structured Cooperation and set
targeted criteria (before deciding on an inclusive or exclusive approach);
2. that EU member states make more available of what they already have;
3. that EU member states spend more on investment (R&D, procurement);
4. to think about how the number of deployable armed forces can be increased;THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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5. to understand, that as a result of Permanent Structured Cooperation, the EU
should be better in certain ESDP fields (definition of the added value of Per-
manent Structured Cooperation).
Session 3: The Future of Defence Planning
The third panel elaborated on the defence planning by the EU and NATO. It was
discussed how national defence planning can effectively be influenced by both
institutions.
EU defence planning
Special emphasis was placed on the role of the EDA and its Capabilities Devel-
opment Plan (CDP). It was explained that the EDA had been set up to support
the EU member states and the EU Council, to help strengthening European
capabilities and to sustain ESDP. The agency’s main functions were identified as
follows: (1) identification of capabilities-shortfalls, (2) development of capabil-
ities, (3) promotion of defence research and (4) progress in the field of arma-
ments cooperation. A first guideline for the EU’s capability needs in 2025 had
been set up by the Long-Term Vision, elaborated by the EU Institute for Security
Studies in cooperation with the EDA. Capabilities need to be developed in a
comprehensive and integrated process and the CDP can be an important tool to
assist EU member states to make progress. In the long-term perspective, the CDP
can improve the EU’s strategic planning process, identify future trends and thus
give the Long-Term Vision more substance. In the short term, the CDP will focus
on EU member states’ defence plans and equipment programmes and identify
lessons learned. The added value of the CDP would be to provide a comprehen-
sive picture of the EU member states’ defence planning processes and to discuss
the EU’s status quo (where are we now?). Thus, the CDP could be a starting
point for a common EU capability planning and show the way ahead. The role
of the EDA is to provide a clearer focus for EU member states to coordinate their
programmes and find partners. Neither the EDA nor the CDP duplicate or
hinder defence planning programmes set up by NATO.
NATO defence planning
The EU and NATO are equally interested in more effective defence planning.
The respective shortfalls, approaches and objectives in the field of capabilities
development are similar. Furthermore, both organisations face the same prob-THE LISBON TREATY AND ESDP: TRANSFORMATION AND INTEGRATION
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lems when discussing and implementing new initiatives: the lack of political will,
appropriate funding and internal coherence. Moreover, one should not forget
that member states are confronted with the challenge of transforming and mod-
ernising their armed forces at the same time. It was also cautioned that a collec-
tive defence planning cannot guarantee the delivery of the agreed objectives (e.g.
pooling of capabilities), given that defence planning measures and the deploy-
ment of troops are decided on the national level. This explains the mismatch
between the forces and equipment theoretically available (e.g. helicopters) and
the commitments made by member states during force generation conferences.
Also, NATO needs to tackle the problem that a high number of its member
states do not meet the benchmark of deployable and sustainable forces. To
improve coordination and harmonisation of the defence planning process,
NATO seeks to provide a flexible and integrated framework with its Defence
Capability Initiative (DCI), focusing on the short-, medium- and long-term
requirements.
With regard to the relations between the EU and NATO, it was reminded that
25 EU member states participate in NATO’s capability planning and that this
should strengthen both the EU’s and NATO’s capability to act. Member states
in both organisations should better coordinate their efforts, focus on joint
approaches and make efforts to establish one single set of forces. The improve-
ment of the EU-NATO partnership was considered a strategic priority for the
second half of 2008 under the French EU-Presidency and the first months of
2009 before the next NATO-Summit in France and Germany. The panellists
concluded by emphasising that both organisations need to redouble their
efforts.
The Austrian perspective
Subsequently, the particularities of Austria with regard to the EU and NATO
defence planning were analysed. The 2005 Defence Review (Bundesheerreform
ÖBH 2010) commits the Austrian armed forces to fulfil the following tasks: (1)
territorial defence, (2) protection of the Austrian population, (3) assistance in
case of disasters and incidents in Austria, (4) support of international law and
order, (5) contribution to the EU’s Security and Defence Policy. The Defence
Review places special importance on the last point. Although Austria is not a
member of NATO, a large number of the 1399 soldiers abroad is deployed
within the framework of NATO operations. Further international commitments
are directed towards the UN and EU. The multiple international engagements
and different requirements make it difficult for Austria to shape a clear package
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The EDA’s Capabilities Development Plan could be helpful to define the external
shape for capabilities development and pre-identify targets. Against the back-
ground of the Austrian participation in EUFOR Chad/CAR, one argument
underlined that the involved EU member states could have been more efficient
with their contributions (e.g. in the field of logistics and force protection). Per-
manent Structured Cooperation could help EU member states to make best use
of what they already have. From the Austrian perspective, further possible tasks
for Permanent Structured Cooperation were (1) to pre-identify capability needs
and most probable scenarios for ESDP operations, (2) to pool military staff and
to improve communication between EU member states, (3) to maintain capabil-
ity packages on a high level, (4) to create an interoperable capabilities pool and
to go beyond the EU BG 1500 concept. However, before entering into further
details, it would be important to discuss the finalité of Permanent Structured
Cooperation and to solve the question of inclusiveness or exclusiveness. The
panellist argued for an inclusive approach, pointing to the danger of a two-class
system within the framework of ESDP.
Session 4: Permanent Command & Control
The fourth panel discussed the need for permanent EU command & control
(C2) structures at the strategic level (OHQ). C2 has always been critical for
military operations throughout history and it was emphasised that improvisa-
tion and ad-hoc structures can undermine the success of any operation. There-
fore, C2 should not be regarded as an abstract concept but requires a unity of
effort from both the political authority and military command.
While NATO is currently revising its permanent C2 structure and reducing a
number of OHQs, the EU has no permanent structure yet. The NATO C2 sys-
tem has been working for decades and was considered a crucial integration fac-
tor for NATO. If the EU decides to launch an ESDP mission, it can either use
NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin Plus Agreement, or activate one
of the five national OHQs that have been made available by EU framework
nations or use the new Operations Centre at the EUMS. However, these options
were judged rather inefficient with regard to:
1. decision-making,
2. burden-sharing,
3. rapid reaction,
4. sharing of information,
5. time management,
6. the chain of command,
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8. training,
9. earmarking of personnel and accommodation of staff.
There was agreement that ad-hoc solutions for C2 structures do not provide an
adequate approach and undermine the EU’s effectiveness and credibility in inter-
national crisis management. So far, the EU has been involved in five military and
thirteen civilian respectively civilian-military ESDP operations in different sce-
narios worldwide. Although the scale and size of those operations were limited,
the EU has successfully contributed to global stability and security. Within the
framework of ESDP missions, the EU has acted with NATO or UN support or
on an autonomous basis. These operations were beneficial to the EU and its
member states: EU countries from Northern and Eastern Europe have become
familiar with challenges to peace and security on the African continent and the
EU’s peacekeeping capacity has a good reputation in Africa, Asia and the Mid-
dle East. Those developments require a greater synergy of EU instruments and
– first and foremost – an appropriate C2 system. It would be counter-productive
to rely on external or not adequately equipped C2 structures.
No duplication with NATO
Although the global security objectives of the EU and NATO are very close, the
two organisations have their own rationale and legitimacy to act. Both organi-
sations need to have the capabilities and structures to act autonomously. More-
over, the existence of the two frameworks does not affect the availability of
troops and resources – both the EU and NATO rely on assets and capabilities
provided by their member states. Also, the two organisations do not follow the
same approach in the field of civilian-military cooperation. While NATO does
not dispose of civilian instruments but focuses on the cooperation with civilian
actors in the respective theatres of operations, the EU integrates both civilian
and military elements. Given the different focus and tools of the EU and NATO,
a permanent EU OHQ would therefore not duplicate existing NATO structures.
Creation of a permanent OHQ in Brussels
There was agreement that the EU should strive to do more and set up a perma-
nent strategic C2 structure in Brussels. The new Watch Centre in the EUMS was
considered a first step in the right direction but the EU should go further. The
following arguments were brought up:
1. The number and the diversity of ESDP operations require a solid C2 struc-
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global situation awareness and providing continuous expertise, information
and analysis for the political leadership.
2. The existing options for building an EU operational chain of command are
not adequate for rapid response operations.
3. The EU needs operational expertise from the very outset of strategic plan-
ning and on a routine level.
4. A permanent OHQ in Brussels would be cost-effective, allow for a better
pooling of resources, speed up the planning process and facilitate communi-
cation and cooperation between EU member states and EU institutions. It
would also alleviate the burden on EU framework nations (who are often not
willing to opt for high-intensity operations and engage in missions with
uncertain duration).
5. The EU needs symmetric C2 structures for civilian, military and civilian-mil-
itary operations to better integrate its respective crisis management capabil-
ities. A permanent military structure would complement the EU’s Civilian
Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).
6. A permanent OHQ in Brussels would facilitate engagement and representa-
tion for smaller EU member states, given the difficulties to send permanent
liaison officers to the five framework nations’ OHQs.
7. A permanent OHQ would provide a forum to identify lessons learned from
past ESDP missions and strengthen the EU’s institutional memory.
8. These structures would create synergies for the development of an EU stra-
tegic culture and strengthen understanding, confidence and solidarity
between EU member states.
The conclusion was reached that the creation of a permanent OHQ would be
beneficial to the EU and its credibility and visibility worldwide. It would be cost-
effective, facilitate EU planning, raise the quality of military expertise and
enhance civilian-military cooperation.